tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6547653347296107692.post5385522101884266026..comments2024-01-09T12:59:32.666+01:00Comments on Narrative and Ontology: "Ecclesial Context": Brueggemann vs ChildsPhil Sumpterhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/16491514886782881340noreply@blogger.comBlogger5125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6547653347296107692.post-61429440909985171602007-11-07T18:47:00.000+01:002007-11-07T18:47:00.000+01:00One needs a theological awareness of the nature of...<EM>One needs a theological awareness of the nature of Christian faith, the nature of the text, and the relation between the two.</EM><BR/><BR/>(1) The nature of the text —<BR/>Here I would affirm Brueggemann's conviction that the text is multivocal. Let me work with a significant example that I feel I have some grasp of: the <EM>purity</EM> thread vs. the <EM>justice</EM> thread. Both threads run throughout the Hebrew scriptures.<BR/><BR/>(2) The nature of Christian faith —<BR/>With many liberals, I tend to take my stand with the Jesus of the synoptic Gospels. The sermon on the mount; his embrace of social outcasts; his prioritizing of the law of love over concerns about defilement.<BR/><BR/>In other words, Jesus represents the <EM>justice</EM> thread over against the Pharisees, who represent the <EM>purity</EM> thread. Even when Jesus appears to be concerned about purity (e.g. with respect to divorce) he may, in fact, be concerned about justice for cast-off women.<BR/><BR/>(3) The relation between the two —<BR/>I have no doubt that faith must be grounded in scripture. Indeed, I work very diligently at exegesis and, as I like to put it, <EM>letting the text speak</EM>.<BR/><BR/>However, letting the text speak means acknowledging the barely-concealed disagreements which lie close to the surface of the canonical texts.<BR/><BR/>The relevant principle here, in my view, is the developmental model of revelation. We don't view scripture as static: we see that Israel's faith is developing along a certain trajectory, which presumably reflects lessons they are actually learning from God.<BR/><BR/>Concerns about defilement are ancient. They are virtually universal in ancient religions. Presumably they predate the Hebrew scriptures.<BR/><BR/>Concern for justice, on the other hand, represented an innovation. It's clear that already with the Pentateuch we have a concern for the poor that goes beyond what we see in other ancient religions. In other words, a breakthrough in Israel's understanding of what matters to God.<BR/><BR/>As we arrive at the prophets, we see a denunciation of Temple worship insofar as it provides cover for social injustice. Certain people kid themselves that they are "right" before God because they are scrupulous in their Temple observances. At least some of the prophets used very strong language to repudiate worship rites and focus attention on social inequities instead.<BR/><BR/>Clearly, I have by no means abandoned a critical approach to scripture. And I do not think the canonical approach will help us here, because both threads are clearly canonical! But when push came to shove, Jesus sided with the prophets: in support of social justice, against Temple rites. (Remember that he was accused of saying that he would tear the Temple down!)<BR/><BR/>Because our faith takes a Christian shape, we ultimately declare that believers are the new Temple of the Holy Spirit. Caring for the physical and spiritual needs of fellow believers thus becomes paramount, as we see throughout Acts.<BR/><BR/>Perhaps my analysis is simplistic. I'm neither a theologian nor a philosopher, just a semi-educated individual who has devoted a lot of thought to these issues. But perhaps you can explain how the canonical approach would approach those three points (faith, text, and the relation between the two) and how it would differ from my summary of my convictions.stchttps://www.blogger.com/profile/04018824090441668781noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6547653347296107692.post-74252682635330163262007-11-07T18:02:00.000+01:002007-11-07T18:02:00.000+01:00Great, I hope we're coming to some kind of rapproc...Great, <BR/><BR/>I hope we're coming to some kind of rapprochement. <BR/><BR/><EM> I think we need to leave that tension hanging there</EM><BR/><BR/>I think we're agreed (including Childs and Brueggemann), that where tension is intended, there it should remain. It would be as wrong to iron over it as it is to create it where it is unnecessary – perhaps a danger both scholars should beware of. <BR/><BR/><EM>Shall we just say, Well, that's the canonical shape of the text? Or shall we stand in judgement on that canonical shape and say, We repudiate that self-serving power structure? </EM><BR/><BR/>Great question. My concern is where does one draw the criteria to make that value judgement. My recent comments <A HREF="http://narrativeandontology.blogspot.com/2007/11/postmodernists-believe-in-objective.html" REL="nofollow">above </A>are that postmodern theory alone isn't enough. One needs a theological awareness of the nature of Christian faith, the nature of the text, and the relation between the two.Phil Sumpterhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16491514886782881340noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6547653347296107692.post-51552907638629563512007-11-06T22:08:00.000+01:002007-11-06T22:08:00.000+01:00In short, there's a difference between talk of the...<EM>In short, there's a difference between talk of the absence of God as an epistemological reality and as an ontological reality. Unless one is willing to believe his ontological absence, the structure of your faith in times of crisis seems to parallel that of the present, canonical shape of Ecclesiastes, doesn't it</EM>?<BR/><BR/>Agreed. I understand why the text always swings back to a position of faith. However, that doesn't mean that the orthodox appendix to the book is not a distortion of what the author of Ecclesiastes set out to say.<BR/><BR/>In fact, I'm not convinced that Brueggemann means literally that God is capricious. I think he is saying exactly what you just said: that <EM>in our experience</EM> God <EM>seems</EM> to be absent and silent sometimes. I resist the attempt to smooth that over too quickly. I think we need to leave that tension hanging there: the tension between Israel's core testimony and Israel's countertestimony, of occasions when God seemed not to live up to his promises.<BR/><BR/>And there are many more critical issues than this one that arises in Ecclesiastes. What do we do about the patriarchal norms of the text, for example? The canonical shape of the text relegates women to a second-tier status. Shall we just say, <EM>Well, that's the canonical shape of the text</EM>? Or shall we stand in judgement on that canonical shape and say, <EM>We repudiate that self-serving power structure</EM>?stchttps://www.blogger.com/profile/04018824090441668781noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6547653347296107692.post-47283833585512907272007-11-03T18:31:00.000+01:002007-11-03T18:31:00.000+01:00Thanks Stephen,the fact that in other places you w...Thanks Stephen,<BR/><BR/>the fact that in other places you will catch me saying very similar sounding things is testimony that we're are, perhaps talking past each other. I appreciate a lot of what you say, but here's my attempt to clarify my position somewhat. <BR/><BR/>For a start, I seriously doubt that the difference between the exegetical approaches of Childs and Brueggemann or between you and I, are a matter of personality. I too have been through protracted periods of crisis, where my favourite Psalm was the blackest in the Bible (Ps. 88), and where any biblical image of the cold absence of God was a comfort to me. I appreciate indeterminacy and uncertainty, imperfection as far as theological systems are concerned, and I embrace the subjectivity of our existence (see my first posts on this <A HREF="http://narrativeandontology.blogspot.com/2007/09/programmatic-statement-no-1.html" REL="nofollow">here</A> and <A HREF="http://narrativeandontology.blogspot.com/2007/09/programmatic-statement-no-2-amos-5.html" REL="nofollow">here</A>). <BR/><BR/>I can understand that you think I am taking a 'postivist' position, especially when I use the term 'norm'. But that doesn't have to be the case. Epistemological statements about our finitude (which we all agree on) and theological statements about what God is actually doing, are simply two different types of statement that should not be confused. When Derrida says everything is subjective, he's not saying that, therefore, there is no external reality that constrains our interpretations of it. The raw concrete reality of fire, for example, is something that exceeds my ability to grasp or fully conprehend its 'being', but that doesn't stop it from burning me. The same goes for the Brueggemann/Childs dispute (at least as I have presented it). It is one thing to say that humans are subjective and can't arrive at an objective interpretation, it is another to say that God himself doesn't communicate to us by means of a text that functions as a concrete guide in our daily experience, which is all Childs is saying. Childs doesn't take an 'innocent' approach to exegesis. His claim that we are able to submit to the 'coercion' of the text upon us is a theological statement, something about the way God works. God has chosen this text as a context to reveal himself, and it would seem, when one looks at both it and classic Christian formulations of faith (kerygma), that this text has a concrete 'something' it wants to say. How we discover that, and all the partiality that involves is another matter. <BR/><BR/>Thus, Childs is making a theological statement, justifying it by reference to the Text and Tradition. Brueggemann is making an epistemological statement, and the <EM> turning it into</EM> a theological statement without reference to either the text or tradition. Of course you will contradit me here, and list all the conflicting verses in the Bible. But Childs makes concrete arguments about the way the text <EM>looks</EM>, and indeed should <EM>function</EM>. These suggestions of Childs do not claim to be 'objective' and therefore automatically better then whatever Brueggemann says, as if he is just being 'subjective'. They are 'theories' in the normal sense of the term, attempts to explain the material as best as possible in light of the variables. I haven't seem Brueggemann actually respond on this level,either theologically (his understanding of the kerygma leads him to his conclusions) or exegetically (actually no, there is no such thing as canonical shaping). He seems, at least, to just restate his epistemological insight, i.e. humans are particular and subjective, and use that to dethrone Childs' suggestions. As long as he remains at the anthropocentric level, is is talking past Childs. He seems to be making postmodern theory do more than it is designed to do. I'm not sure you can take Derrida et al and make them normative for how one does exegesis and theology (as Brueggemann seems to do, yes he to has norms). At best, postmodernism should be used to help us understand the Bible and ourselves, but not be placed over the Bible and ourselves. It's a tool like any other. <BR/><BR/><EM>"preference" and even "tradition" does not constitute objective evidence that Childs's approach is right while Brueggemann's is out of bounds.</EM><BR/><BR/>Can you see now why that statement misses the point? <BR/><BR/><EM>Therefore a postmodern person who feels that God is absent, yet who struggles to be faithful to the covenant anyway, can take comfort in knowing that he is not experiencing something unique. The experience of God's absence is not a new, postmodern development. People of faith have faced such challenges and survived them in generations </EM><BR/><BR/>The question is why you would want to hang on to God when he disappears? If he is capricious, what's worth waiting for? Saying that you have no evidence of him is not the same as saying he is not there, surely ... And why would you believe he is there, despite your experience, if not for the promises and claims that is is, even when it's unbelievable? At rock bottom, someone in that situation <EM>has</EM> to believe that God will arise, or his strength will fail and he'll look for help elsewhere. Believing in God's presence despite the circumstances is what the Bible calls 'faith'. If this is right, then the fact that the epilogue in Ecclesiastes regulates the cynicism of the rest of the book is a mirror of our genuine struggles: without faith in the core promises we wouldn't be able to continue at all. <BR/><BR/>In short, there's a difference between talk of the absence of God as an epistemological reality and as an ontological reality. Unless one is willing to believe his ontological absence, the structure of your faith in times of crisis seems to parallel that of the present, canonical shape of Ecclesiastes, doesn't it?Phil Sumpterhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16491514886782881340noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6547653347296107692.post-60192655428291846732007-11-02T23:11:00.000+01:002007-11-02T23:11:00.000+01:00That's a very well written post, Phil, with an evi...That's a very well written post, Phil, with an evident desire both to be faithful to scripture and to build up the Church. I don't have a strong reaction against your argument, but I would like to "spin" the same data a little differently.<BR/><BR/><EM>For Brueggemann, the church represents the contemporary context within which interpreters are situated. It is the reality out of which we do our interpretation. … The reality of the church is a broken one, marked by competing interpretations as different elements make their bids for power. Theological interpretation, then, should highlight the 'little', marginalised texts and give them a voice, such that they subvert the dominating texts of the Bible.</EM><BR/><BR/>I am by no means a Brueggemann expert. But I would simply say that Brueggemann (who is very pragmatic, ever mindful of pastoral realities) is responding to the extraordinary challenge of postmodernity (or late modernity, or whatever one wishes to call this current epoch of history).<BR/><BR/>I would say that Brueggemann and Childs take the two obvious options that one might take in response to postmodern fragmentation and relativization.<BR/><BR/>One might simply oppose it, which is Childs's approach (or so it seems to me). One might say, <EM>The Church is committed to a stable norm, even if the secular society around us has no such norm</EM>. It seems to me that that is Childs's response: a re-assertion of orthodoxy in defiance of the postmodern relativization of all values and norms.<BR/><BR/>Brueggemann takes a different approach. He recognizes that the biblical text has been exposed, by critical scholarship, as incoherent. He recognizes the results of historical-critical scholarship, which have called into question the historicity of many of the events recounted in the Bible, and also the integrity of the biblical texts. He insists that we cannot go back to a period of innocence, when we could take the texts at face value.<BR/><BR/>But he sets out to make a virtue of that apparent demerit. He does this by saying that biblical faith has sufficient breadth to accommodate a variety of theological positions and experiences. Experiences include seasons when God's promises appear to be contradicted, seasons when God appears to be absent, etc., which are amply attested in the biblical texts.<BR/><BR/>Therefore a postmodern person who feels that God is absent, yet who struggles to be faithful to the covenant anyway, can take comfort in knowing that he is not experiencing something unique. The experience of God's absence is not a new, postmodern development. People of faith have faced such challenges and survived them in generations past.<BR/><BR/>I suspect that each of these approaches has its place, as each will appeal to a certain temperament. You and I appear to testify to that reality. I myself have passed through a protracted crisis of faith, and I find Brueggemann's acknowledgement of the absence of God comforting and reassuring (however paradoxical that response may appear).<BR/><BR/>Simply to reassert that scripture has a canonical shape, and God is not capricious but ever-present and reliable — that approach leaves me cold. It isn't true to my experience. And I would affirm, with Brueggemann, that it isn't true to the testimony of the biblical texts.<BR/><BR/>Yes, one must critically deconstruct the biblical texts to see the full weight of the countertestimony to Israel's orthodox confession. But that critical work has been done, and it seems to me that Brueggemann's interpretation of scripture is appropriately alert to the findings of critical scholarship and utilizes them to good advantage.<BR/><BR/>In one of my posts, I said that the difference between the two exegetes comes down to a value judgement. I don't think Childs's approach can be objectively demonstrated to be superior to Brueggemann's approach. I think Brueggemann is absolutely right to characterize the canonical approach as an imaginative construal, certainly a legitimate approach but not the only legitimate one.<BR/><BR/>You obviously prefer Childs's canonical approach to Brueggemann's self-consciously postmodern approach. OK. But "preference" and even "tradition" does not constitute objective evidence that Childs's approach is right while Brueggemann's is out of bounds.<BR/><BR/>• <EM>[Brueggemann] believes that Childs proposal is, by definition, only one more subjective construal of the facts.</EM><BR/><BR/>Here you once again seem to assert something like scientific positivism. Childs's approach is, of course, subjective. Do you deny it?<BR/><BR/>Brueggemann's approach is subjective, too; he would not deny it. As I said before, the difference between them boils down to a value judgement. You might wish it to be more objective and falsifiable than that, but I don't believe it is.stchttps://www.blogger.com/profile/04018824090441668781noreply@blogger.com