Showing posts with label alethiology. Show all posts
Showing posts with label alethiology. Show all posts

Thursday, 25 November 2010

Was ist christliche Erkenntnis?

I'm revisiting old essays and reworking them for the final form of my thesis. In the process I'm discovering Karl Barth in a new dimension. Childs is often said to be Barthian, and this is surely right. But I'm still not sure the implications of what that means have been fully worked out. Is there a treatment to date which expresses the canonical approach in terms of Barth's teaching of the Three Forms of the Word (neither Xun nor Driver mention it)? Unfortunately, I'm only going to be briefly touching on this myself as 50% of my thesis is enacting Childs' hermeneutic and not explaining its intellectual ancestry. Nevertheless, grasping the dogmatic underpinnings of the "canonical approach" (as Childs understood it) is key to implementing it exegetically. I'm grateful to Childs for having introduced me to Barth, whose writings make my heart race almost as much as those of Childs. I do wonder how much my love of Childs is in fact a love of Barth, where the one stops and the other continues. I don't know my Barth well enough to judge just yet.

Here's an awesome quote on the nature of Christian (Biblical) truth that embodies what it is that I love about Barth, and what it is that makes the canonical approach so rich:
Der Begriff des Wissens, der scientia, genügt nicht, umd das zu beschreiben, was christilche Erkenntnis ist. Wir müssen vielmehr zurückgehen auf das, was im Alten Testament die Weisheit genannat wird, was der Grieche sophia nannte und der Lateiner sapientia, um das Wissen der Theologie in seiner Fülle zu erfassen. Sapientia unterscheidet sich von dem engeren Begriff scientia, Weisheit unterscheidet sich von Wissennicht dadurch, daß sie nicht  auch Wissen in sich enthielte, aber darüber hinaus redet dieser Begriff von einem Wissen, das ein praktisches Wissen sit, das die ganze Existenz des Menschen umfaßt. Weißheit ist das Wissen, von dem wir faktisch, praktisch leben dürfen, ist die Empirie und ist die Theorie, welche darin gewaltig ist, daß sie sofort praktisch ist, daß sie das Wissen ist, welches unser Leben beherrscht, welches wirklich ein Licht auf unserem Pfad ist. Nicht ein Licht zum Bestaunen und Betrachten, nicht ein Licht um allerhand Feuerwerke damit anzuzünden - und wenn es auch die tiefsinnigsten philosophischen Spekulationen wären! - sonder das Licht auf unserem Weg, das über unserem Tun und über unserem Reden stehen darf, das Licht in unseren gesunden und in unseren kranken Tagen, in unserer Armut und in unserem Reichtum, das Licht, das nicht nur dann leuchtet, wenn wir Momente der Einsicht zu haben meinen, sonder das uns begleitet auch in unsere Torheit hinein, das nicht verlöscht, wenn alles verlöscht, wenn das Ziel unseres Lebens im Tode sichtbar wird. Von diesem Licht, von dieser Wahrheit leben, das heißt christliches Erkennen. Christliches Erkennen heißt in der Wahrheit Jesus Christi leben.
Karl Barth, Dogmatik im Umriss, in der Universität Bonn vorgelesen, 1946.

Tuesday, 15 July 2008

Gospel truth as "reality"

The following is my translation of Bengt Hägglund's third implication the patristic understanding of the rule-of-truth for dogmatic theology. Click on the following for a summary of its nature for the early church; its significance and content for Irenaeus. Go here for the first implication this has, and here for the second.

The fact that the rule of faith relates to the facts of salvation history sheds new light on doctrinal theology. When one characterises the Christian proclamation as “truth,” this means, among other things, that one understands the the object of this proclamation as “reality,” in contrast to that which is only an appearance or human invention, only idea or a construct of the imagination. The “reality” which is meant here is the content of the revelation, that which the Bible presents as the deeds of God in creation and in the history of Israel, as the words and work of Christ.

In this context “truth” certainly doesn't just mean “reality” in the sense of that which actually happened (von dem tatsächlich Geschehenen), but also that which is true knowledge of God and doctrine which is salvific. But the former meaning does seem to be the fundamental one. It can be seen in places where another, more general sense of the expression is found. This is especially the case with Irenaeus, where talk of a regula veritatis and even of the truth of Christian proclamation at all is directed against the Gnostics, who also present their own doctrines as a “Gospel of truth.”

“Truth” in the theological sense is that which brings salvation and life. It is the knowledge of God which the true God has revealed to humanity. From this perspective we can understand in what sense Christ himself is characterised as the truth. He brings the true knowledge of God and in him, in his name, is salvation and life. But he is also “the truth”—and this connects with what we have just said—because he brings the “reality” of the revelation with himself. He teaches us, in contrast to all idols, to recognise the only true God. Compared to the antetypes of the old Covenant, he presents in himself, in his person, the reality (Col 2.17). He is “the truth” as the God who has revealed himself in the flesh, i.e. in actual human form. Consequently, the relation to “reality,” “actual event,” always plays an important role in the characterisation of Christian doctrine as “truth.”

Monday, 14 July 2008

Christian truth as unchanging reality

I finally come to the second of five implications of the patristic conception of the regula fidei (or regula veritatis) for dogmatics. The first implication - that Christian faith constitutes a unity - I outlined here. The source is Hägglund's "Die Bedeutung der >Regula Fidei<Studia Theologica 12 1958:1-44.
If the oldest form of Christianity reckoned with a regula fidei, then it presupposed that the content of faith from the beginning on was fixed and forever unchanging. As we have seen, this does not mean that the church fathers sanctioned a specific doctrinal axiom. Although the scriptures of the prophets and apostles were normative—and according to a later terminology “canonical”—, they nevertheless functioned as regula only because they they were the original and only authentic witnesses to the salvific events. The unalterability of the faith consists in the fact that these events as facts of past history simply cannot be changed.

The possibility of a “development” of Christian doctrine exists only in the sense that the presentations of the doctrinal content change and, with more or less completeness, is carried out via new methods or through different teachers in different situations. The content of faith itself, the regula fidei, remains unchanged, for the revelatory event itself can be as little changed as historical facts themselves.

Tuesday, 1 July 2008

The Truth of Christianity and a newly discovered blog

I was delighted to receive a comment from a certain Sister Macrina Walker, ocso, a Cistercian monastic of Koningsoord Abbey in the Netherlands. Not only is she well informed concerning good BelgianTrappist beer, she has her own blog, A Vow of Conversation. According to the "About" section, she has "questions about the role of tradition in theology and became increasingly aware of the shortcomings of a typically Western modern-cum-postmodern theology that is cut of from the life of faith and the tradition of the Church." She's particular interested in the Church Fathers, with a completed thread dealing with the Syrian Fathers here (she also links to a fascinating Syrian Encylopaedia , the WikiSyriaca, here).

If that isn't enough to make her blog worth reading, she also happens to be a big fan of Andrew Lowth, a scholar whose significance I am slowly beginning to grasp.

As always, it's Brevard Childs who got me onto the Lowth trail. Childs' later work was dedicated to finding continuity in the Christian tradition, evidence of a theological force creating a Wirkungsgeschichte with a certain profile. Key is the centrality of the hermeneutical category of allegory and the distinction between a literal and a spiritual sense to Christian scripture. It is Childs' influence by Karl Barth - especially his understanding of Scripture as "witness" - that enabled continuity between Childs' historical critical, canonical, and later ... well ... "theological" exegesis.

It's so incarnational it hurts. In a nice way.

Here's a great Lowth quote, taken from Sister Macrina Walker's personal introduction:

For the truth that lies at the heart of theology is not something there to be discovered, but something, or rather someone, to whom we must surrender. The mystery of faith is not ultimately something that invites our questioning, but something that questions us.
Andrew Louth, Discerning the Mystery. An Essay on the Nature of Theology (Oxford: Clarendon, 1983) 95.

Saturday, 28 June 2008

Irenaeus and the regula veritatis

For Irenaeus, the regula veritatis refers to that which was there from the beginning: an unshakeable, unchangeable truth, proclaimed by Jesus and the apostles and preserved by the church in Scripture. It is truth itself, revealed in the proclamation of the prophets and apostles and passed on to the Christian at baptism. It is this reality itself that is the unique, absolute norm for faith and practice. This reality is not to be identified with either scripture or tradition, it is rather the reality to which scripture and tradition witness. It lies behind the church's tradition, within which it finds its continual witness. The regula veritatis, then, is the “really real,” the actual content of faith, the revelation itself, the actual events of salvation history, and as such is universal, unitary, and self-consistent. The function of the baptismal creed is to to summarise this reality; the function of scripture is to witness to this reality; and the function of tradition is to preserve the teaching of the scripture concerning this reality. Hägglund says,

It is not dependent on the letters or the wording of the [Baptismal] Confession, but rather on the reality which is behind it, which is presented in the sentences of the Confession. It is evident that the various formulations can change, without the truth being changed in the process (12).
German: “Es kommt nicht auf den Buchstaben oder dem Wortlaut des Bekenntnisses an, sondern auf die dahinterliegende Wirklichkeit, die in den Sätzen des Bekenntnisses kurz dargestellt wird. Es ist selbstverständlich, dass die Formulierungen wechseln können, ohne dass damit die Wahrheit verändert wird.” (12).

Wednesday, 25 June 2008

Existential faith and the regula fidei

About a month ago, Stephen and Doug had an exchange concerning the nature of "truth," especially within the Christian tradition. Doug's position is apparently the following:

The truth is objective; we’re just unable to agree on it.
Which for Stephen is a self-refuting question: "It boils down to, the truth is subjective."

This is hardly a post-modern issue. Ever since the Jews rejected Jesus and the Gnostics started doing their own thing, "truth" within the church has been a contested commodity.

Which provides the intro for my next thread, namely the nature of the "rule of truth" for the early church fathers and the implications that has for Christian dogmatics. My thoughts consist in my translation of a fascinating essay by Bengt Hägglund entitled, "Die Bedeutung der >Regula Fidei< als Grudnlage theologischer Aussagen," Studia Theologica 12 1958:1-44 ("The significance of the regula fidei as a basis for theological statements"). This article was recommended to Daniel Driver in an interview with Brevard Childs as one of the most influential for his thought. I have found it incredibly enlightening, especially given the directions toward allegory which took place in Childs' later thought.

So, for today, some opening thoughts:

What is the regula fidei? Writing in 1958 Bengt Hägglund noted that although this concept played a central role in the theology of the ancient church and continued to be seen as a fully appropriate and unproblematic category amongst the scholastics and old Protestants, within contemporary theology it has come to be seen as a “scrap of lifeless tradition” (Stück nicht mehr lebendiger Tradition). Though the concept of “faith” has received a central role, it has acquired a meaning that differs sharply to that of the ancient church. When the church fathers spoke of the regula fidei or regula veritatis, they were referring to a concrete doctrine, a reality fixed from the beginning onwards, on the basis of which one could distinguish between truth and falsity. Contemporary theology, on the other hand, sees “faith” as a personal, existential category which transcends all doctrinal norms. If the church is to be faithful to its apostolic and prophetic roots, it is necessary to ask just what the church fathers meant when they spoke of the regula fidei. What is the content of the regula fidei? How does it relate to dogmatic construction? Finally, how can this concept help us clarify the fundamental dogmatic questions concerning the relationship between Scripture and Tradition, Proclamation and Doctrine?

More on this soon ...

Saturday, 26 April 2008

Gabler wasn't all bad

In a recent post I raised the question concerning the nature of the unity of the final form of the biblical text. Contrary to popular misconception, Childs does not locate the Bible's unity in a unitary literary structure. Rather, the unity is outside of the Bible, in its referent, which is theological. The diversity of witnesses present are unified by their source and not by their perspective.

The corollary of this insight is that exegesis which wishes to really get to the “substance” of what the Bible is about needs to go beyond describing the contours of each individual witness and “push through” the text to theological reality that called them into being. This activity of “pushing through” is consonant with the intentionality of the text itself, as it is ultimately kerygmatic, i.e. it functions to proclaim something.

As I noted in the previous post, this brings Childs closer to the exegetical approach of Gabler, rather than Frei, with whom he is more usually associated. Here's the key quote from Gabler:

"If exegesis is to be nothing more than giving an account of the meaning of a writer--of what he himself meant by what he said--then no doubt the conventional explanation of the story of Jesus' temptation as an objective appearance and activity of Satan is the only true one, for in their account Matthew and Luke appear to have nothing more in mind. Once this fact has been established, the task of the grammatical exegete is indeed at an end, since he has only the concern himself with the true meaning of his author. If we know only the meaning of a biblical passage, we in our day are very little further ahead. It is now the turn of historical and philosophical criticism, which subjects such a biblical passage to its closest examination. This critical analysis functions in the area of explanation of content, just as the discovery of the grammatical meaning functions in the area of the explanation of words. The task of the Biblical exegete involves both. In fact, then, we can draw a valid distinction between interpretation and explanation: to the former belongs only the attempt to recover the meaning of the passage; to the latter, on the other hand, the explanation of the matter itself. . . . In our day is anyone satisfied, for example, with the merely grammatical interpretation of the Mosaic cosmogony and of the earliest story of mankind?" [*]
Gabler, along with most of his generation, noted a certain dissatisfaction with pure exposition of the “meaning” of the text. Surely the question of truth must arise too, and that is dealt with by looking at the “content” of the Bible. The fascinating question is what is the content (or the Sachverhalt, or res as Childs called it) of the Bible? That is where Childs parts company with Gabler, with direct hermeneutical implications.

[*] J. Ph. Gabler, "Über den Unterschied zwischen Auslegung und Erklärung erläutert durch die verschiedene Behandlungsart der Versuchungeschichte Jesu," Neuestes theologisches Journal 6 (1880):224ff, repr. in Kleinere theologische Scriften, vol 1, p. 201ff; quoted in Kümmel, The New Testament: The History of the Investigation of its Problems, p. 102-103.

[HT Michael for the quote ;)]

Friday, 14 September 2007

What's your alethiology?

In the course of an involved, fascinating, and highly significant discussion on my post below, I have learnt a new word: 'alethiology'. It means “theory of truth” and would seem to be at the heart my disagreement with John Poitier over the Chrsitian credentials of my hero Brevard Childs. The following definition is succinct and provides the key to the crux of our debate:
Alethiology (or Alethology) literally means 'the study of truth', but can more accurately be translated as 'the study of the nature of truth'. It could be argued that this is synonymous with epistemology, the study of knowledge, and that dividing the two is mere semantics, but there is a defintite distinction between the two. Epistemology is the study of absolute or factual truth - or to coin a phrase of 'known knowns'. Alethiology is more deeply concerned with the nature of truth rather than the facts of truth. What is truth, rather than what facts are true.
John is of the opinion that the New Testament evinces an “alethiology of space time actuality”, whereas Childs' so-called 'canonical approach', despite its intentions to the contrary, assumes an “alethiology of storytime actuality”. This then would undermine Childs' claim that the canonical approach represents an authentically 'Christian' way of reading the Bible in the 21st century.

Of course, this argument is fascinating to me, as up until now I've debated with people from the secular end of the spectrum who claim that Childs is too Christian and thus imports an external ideology into ancient texts.

Seitz has commented on the wide spectrum of disagreement on Childs' approach: from both the left and the right. To quote:
Childs's Biblical Theology may prove to be a book in search of an audience, and for that reason it will be judged by the widest variety of readers as learned but unsatisfactory and by an even smaller audience as the most brilliant proposal for theological exegesis offered in recent memory, but one unlikely to gain the sort of foothold necessary to transform the church in its use of scripture. (1998: 108, 9)
I think I'm converted, but the debate goes on. Check out the discussion as central issues are raised which will repeatedly reappear in the course of my thread on 'theological exegesis'.