Yesterday I posted a review article by
Brueggemann on
Childs'
Isaiah: A Commentary (you can download the
pdf file
there). Today I wish to review
Brueggemann's evaluation of
Childs' theological approach.
Before we can evaluate
Brueggemann's response, it is important to understand
Brueggemann's own agenda. Like
Childs,
Brueggemann is interested in a 'theological reading' of the Bible. In order to develop his own proposal,
Brueggemann takes human consciousness as his starting point (see my post
here, where I defend this). He's basic organizing principle is an observation concerning human subjectivity: we are not always 'present' to ourselves, rather we we are
inextricably entwined in our social and cultural contexts. Our view points are always subjective
construals of an external reality, made by the force of our imaginative capabilities. Objective knowledge is an impossibility, rather all we have are competing interpretations negotiable by nothing other than the norms bequeathed us by our respective traditions.
From this starting point,
Brueggemann wants to propose a reading that is 'theological' in that it is 'pastoral'. In other words, for a Bible to be relevant to a
epistemologically limited church, it needs to reflect that church. The Bible too must be broken, partial and conflicting. The Bible functions as the place where we come to be deconstructed, shown the impossibility of the finality of our truth claims, as regardless of what we say they will be subverted by an alternative, competing voices.
Childs makes a different proposal. He suggests that the Bible is not as contradictory as
Brueggemann claims. Rather, when one reads it according to its
kerygmatic ('canonical') intentionality, one can discern particular theological moves at work within the text, organising and sifting the material in order to make broader theological claims. He believes that the Bible is designed to function as a guide for faith and conduct, shaped in such a way that its final literary form is able to function as an authoritative norm. This is a claim about the nature of the text itself, which he backs up with theological arguments concerning scripture and the ways of God in the world.
One can see that
Childs' proposal is antithetical to
Brueggemann's, in that he is making claims for theological
normativity. The Bible "coerces" our interpretations of it (or it "urges itself upon us", to use the language of my post
here), it is authoritative and as such we must bow before it. Elsewhere,
Childs makes clear that he is not operating with a naive concept of 'objectivity', as if his claims simply 'fall out of this sky' without any
intermediating work on the part of the interpreter (note
Brueggemann's crude caricature of
Childs' approach on p. 25, comparing him to Aaron).
Childs explicitly characterises the nature of theological engagement as one of "struggle", in which each generation must commit itself to the task of being faithful within the theological boundaries that have been set for it. His is just one proposal, at this point in time, a self-confessedly partial attempt to comprehend the nature of God, his scripture and his church.
Brueggemann's response to
Childs' concrete proposals concerning text, church and God is to simply assert that all humans are subjective and therefore
Childs' proposals can't be binding on the church (I will leave aside his only concrete criticism of the canonical approach concerning the tension of the diachronic and
synchronic [23-25] for later, if people are interested).
Throughout the review, you can see the following logic being played out again and again:
1) Truth claims are only normative if they can be objectively demonstrated.
2)
Childs is human, therefore nothing he says is objective.
3) Therefore, the canonical approach is at best only one helpful idea among others.
Thus we see that, despite his appreciation of what
Childs has contributed,
Brueggemann constantly draws attention to the fact that
Childs is a subjective human like anyone else.
Childs is operating with an interpretive agenda, his canonical approach is a mighty act of interpretive imagination, his perspective has been legitimated only by the power of his argument (i.e. not by the coercion of the text), he is culturally situated, his main virtues are 'passion, resilience and steadfastness' rather then an ability to figure out the material at hand.
These observations are fine as they go. I'm sure
Childs would agree with them (despite
Brueggemann's claims to the contrary). The problem, as I see it, is that
Childs' very subjectivity, i.e. his humanity, is the reason why
Brueggemann rejects his canonical proposal as a genuine proposal for the church, one which could even become normative.
Brueggemann seems to be working with the assumption that something can only be normative if one can objectively demonstrate that something is "given" in the text. Since this is
epistemologically impossible,
Childs' project is doomed to failure from the start (to quote: "Yet
Childs ... proceeds as though his interpretive finesse were simply a "given" in the text itself", p. 25).
But surely this is to mix up two categories? It's one thing to say all truth is subjective (
Childs agrees, thus obviating
Brueggemann's need to keep pointing this out), it's another thing to say that a particular suggestion about that reality is not binding by virtue of this subjectivity. What makes a theological
heremeneutic normative is not whether it can be objectively demonstrated, but rather how well it gels with the text as authoritative and Christian tradition (the
kerygma). The best way to evaluate
Childs' proposal is not to set up the impossible requirement of objective certainty but rather to engage in the content of his argument and come to a decision based on it. This is something I haven't seen
Brueggemann do. Instead, he repeats that
Childs is subjective and as such his proposals cannot be taken as prescriptive for theological interpretation.
In order to back up his claims concerning
Childs' subjectivity, he goes on to make a series of hideous caricatures. He claims, for example, that
Childs simply believes that meaning 'falls out of the text' without the need for interpretation.
Childs'
apparently naive belief that his interpretations do in fact correspond to reality leads to the accusation that he believes his interpretations have 'canonical status', that he somehow sees himself as a 'canonical commentator'.
Brueggemann goes on to present
Childs as someone who believes that his interpretation is "beyond criticism, as though it were an unquestioned given in the text itself". The fact that
Childs thinks he may be right is enough for
Brueggemann to claim that
Childs believes he can't be questioned.
Childs' attempt to see the text for what it is, and to make the audacious claim that maybe it really is so, is enough for
Brueggemann to accuse him of thinking he is pure, innocent and detached. Finally,
Childs' attempt to understand
Isaiah 66.23-24 as making an ontological distinction is dismissed on the basis that it is simply a "rhetorical venture", with no attempt on Brueggemann's to explain why it might not be more.
A final example of
Brueggemann's rejection of
Childs' claims by virtue of the fact that
Childs is a mere human is his rejection of
Childs' talk of "coercion". Why is
Childs wrong to talk of the text coercing his interpretation?
Because other scholars disagree with him. But what kind of standard is that to judge the acceptability of a proposal for theological exegesis? It seems as if
Brueggemann believes that meaning really must just 'fall out' of the text before it can be accepted as authoritative, an impossible standard to meet which thus protects his own position that there can be no norms.
I made
the claim recently that
Brueggemann's starting point is anthropocentric, in that his epistemological theories provide a "critical norm" against which to measure any truth claims made from the side of theology. In his zeal to protect his theory that nothing is normative, nothing is final, that the Bible really is a irreducible collection of contradicting texts, he has set up a modernist standard of truth by which to measure all competing claims. Anyone who claims to have figured out an element of the text is doomed from the outset to fail by this standard.
Brueggemann has
reified postmodernism into an ontological statement about reality, something postmodernism was never designed to do (see my post:
Postmodernists Believe in Objective Reality too!)